فضائح ويكيليكس تتحدث عن ابو الراغب ابان الحرب على العراق..!!

أبان الحرب على العراق: ابوالراغب يبلغ الامريكان أنه مضطر لقول كلمات ضدهم..!! ويكسليكس : نورد تقريراً مؤرخاً في 25/3/2003، ويحمل الرقم 03AMMAN1798، يشير إلى أن رئيس الوزراء الأسبق علي أبو الراغب أبلغ السفير الأمريكي غنيم أن المسؤولين الأردنيين سيضطرون لقول أشياء لن تعجب الولايات المتحدة لمعالجة الغضب الشعبي، ولكنهم سيختارون كلماتهم بحذر.    ويضيف التقرير نفسه أن الحكومة الأردنية، في الآن عينه، تابعت دعمها العسكري المتفق عليه مسبقاً لقوات التحالف… ----- الوثيقة الاصلية  http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2003/03/03AMMAN1798.html# جاري العمل على ترجمتها من قبل موقع البلد نيوز... --- نص الوثيقة المختصر Viewing cable 03AMMAN1798, TFIZ01: KING ABDULLAH, GOJ RETRENCH IN FACE OF If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs  Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 03AMMAN1798 2003-03-25 15:56 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Amman This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.  S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001798  SIPDIS  E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2013  TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ JO SUBJECT: TFIZ01:  KING ABDULLAH, GOJ RETRENCH IN FACE OF  PUBLIC ANGER AGAINST WAR IN IRAQ, BUT STILL SUPPORT US  WHERE IT MATTERS  REF: A. AMMAN 1675       ¶B. AMMAN 1706       ¶C. AMMAN 1718       ¶D. FBIS GMP20030323000339       ¶E. FBIS GMP20030323000308       ¶F. FBIS GMP20030323000292       ¶G. FBIS GMP20030324000163       ¶H. AMMAN 1774  Classified By: A/DCM Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)  -------  SUMMARY  -------  ¶1.  (S)  The sharp and angry public reaction to the start of  war in Iraq has forced King Abdullah and the GOJ to alter  their public line to deal with the public ire.  In a speech  by King Abdullah on March 21, a press conference the next day  with the PM, FonMin and InfoMin, and official news agency  reports of cabinet and other meetings, the GOJ is trying to  create the impression that it is working to end the war in  Iraq.   PM Abul Ragheb told the Ambassador March 24 that GOJ  officials will have to say things the U.S. does not like to  address public anger, but will choose their words carefully.  The King has decided that he needs to be seen as working to  end hostilities, although he has backed off slightly from an  announced new diplomatic initiative, including a planned  phone call to President Bush.  Despite the public pressure,  the GOJ has continued its support to coalition forces, has  frozen Iraqi government assets, and has expelled Iraqi  intelligence officers.  END SUMMARY.  ---------------------------------  ANGRY PUBLIC REACTION RATTLES GOJ  ---------------------------------  ¶2.  (S)  The enraged Jordanian public reaction to the  beginning of hostilities in Iraq (refs a and b and septel)  has caused senior GOJ officials to rethink their public  strategy.  Our security liaison contacts have expressed  concern over the mounting level of anti-U.S. feeling the war  has engendered, and do not want those emotions projected onto  the King or government.  ¶3.  (SBU)  The King, Prime Minister Abul Ragheb, other senior  officials, and the official Petra news agency have  consequently focused their statements on expressions of  opposition to hostilities (in almost exclusively humanitarian  terms) and sympathy with the Iraqi people.  The King in his  March 21 speech to the nation (ref c) called for calm in  Jordan, and tried to focus attention on what Jordan can do  for the future of Iraqis.  In a joint press conference March  23 with Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher and Information  Minister Mohammad Adwan, the Prime Minister announced the  GOJ's opposition to the war, as well as a new Jordanian  diplomatic initiative to end it (refs d and e).  The King was  quoted as telling a cabinet meeting on March 23 that "we must  work to stop the war against Iraq quickly," and denying that  coalition aircraft were using Jordanian airspace to attack  Iraq (ref f).  The King reiterated the no-overflight  statement to members of the Senate March 24, and said  Jordanian territory would not be used to convey troops into  Iraq that were to have gone through Turkey (ref g).  --------------------------------------------  PM:  WE'LL HAVE TO SAY THINGS YOU WON'T LIKE  --------------------------------------------  ¶4.  (S)  PM Abul Ragheb told the Ambassador March 24 that he  had carefully chosen his words during the March 23 news  conference, noting that he had not used "words like killing,  aggression, bombing," but instead had spoken of "military  action" and the need to work to "save people's lives."  That  said, "we need to show our people we are really doing  something" to end the war.  Hence, Jordan was launching a new  diplomatic offensive "to find a resolution acceptable to all  parties."  ¶5.  (S)  He said that, long before the outbreak of war, he  had told the Ambassador that the GOJ "would have to say  things you won't like."  Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher,  Abul Ragheb said, had also made this point to Secretary  Powell in their recent phone conversation.  The bottom line,  the PM emphasized, is that Jordanians see pictures of people  getting killed in Iraq in a war they do not support, and they  are angry.  The GOJ is taking steps to keep the level of  public protest down, and he planned to meet with opposition  party leaders in the next few days to reiterate that the GOJ  will permit pre-approved rallies, but will crack down on  un-approved protests or the use of violence.  ¶6.  (S)  The Ambassador pushed back, saying that, now that  the war has begun, it is clear that Saddam Hussein and his  regime are finished.  Jordan would have to consider the  effect of its statements now on a post-Saddam government in  Baghdad, and on the U.S.  Backpedaling somewhat, Abul Ragheb  responded that the GOJ has "determined that this will not be  like 1991."  ---------------------  POSITIVE NEWS AS WELL  ---------------------  ¶7.  (S/NF)  Despite the increasingly anti-war public  statements, the GOJ continues to take more quiet steps to  support the coalition.  The GOJ has continued its previously  agreed military support to coalition forces (with a few minor  hiccups).  Jordan has frozen the assets of the Iraqi  government in Jordan (ref h).  It has also expelled several  Iraqi intelligence officers operating under diplomatic and  non-official cover, although there is now some question about  who and how many Iraqis have been kicked out.  The GOJ has  also been helped by the lack of an economic crisis associated  with the war in Iraq.  There has been no capital flight,  there are adequate stocks of food and fuel, the Amman stock  exchange has remained stable, and three European air carriers  have resumed earlier suspended flights into Amman.  -------  COMMENT  -------  ¶8.  (S)  The King has told the Ambassador and senior USG  officials several times that he believed the "tipping point"  for the Jordanian public's reaction to war in Iraq would be  scenes on al-Jazeera TV of jubilant Iraqis celebrating their  liberation from Saddam Hussein.  The King expected this in  the early days of the war, and the lack of such scenes has  made him feel exposed.  Iraqi VP Taha Yassin Ramadan's  ranting March 25 press conference attack on Jordan's support  for the coalition has heightened anxiety.  ¶9.  (S)  Given his political exposure, the King has moved to  distance himself personally and the GOJ in general from  military action, and has considered launching a series of  phone calls to P-5 leaders and UN Secretary General Annan  (although he rethought his planned March 25 call to the  President).  He wants to be able to tell his people that he  is actively engaged in finding an end to the war, even if he  is powerless to stop it.  The Foreign Minister has stressed,  however, that the King is determined to do nothing that  undercuts the President's decision to topple Saddam Hussein.  GNEHM